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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal labor law is marked by a tension within the National
Lab6r Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act").' Its general policy favors
private adjustment of labor disputes while specific provisions of the
Act mandate governmental involvement in resolving these disputes.
On the one hand, employers and employees are encouraged to collec-
tively bargain to establish private contractual rules that will govern
their relationship,2 rules that include a system of private settlement
procedures for resolving disputes during the term of an agreement.3
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) ("NLRA" or "Act"). The original
act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-200 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (LMRA).
2. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("It is... the policy of the United States to eliminate
... obstructions to the free flow of commerce.., by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining . . . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of ...
employment .... ").
3. See LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). Section 203(d) provides, in part, that "[fqinal
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is ... the desirable method for settlement
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On the other hand, the Act provides specific statutory protections to
employees, 4 proscribes certain practices on the part of employers and
unions,5 establishes the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board") as an independent federal agency to administer the Act,6
and authorizes a cause of action in federal district court for violations
of a collective bargaining agreement.'
NLRB deferral issues arise when alleged wrongful conduct con-
travenes both the private contractual "law" of the collective bargain-
ing agreement' and the specific statutory proscriptions of the Act.9
Such concurrent violations can thus be remedied in either the contrac-
tual' 0 or statutory forums,"' both of which exist by virtue of the Act.
Normally, the charging party emphasizes the statutory nature of the
violation and requests that the NLRB exercise its power to investigate
and remedy the infraction. The charged party, however, stresses the
contractual nature of the allegation and argues that negotiated con-
tractual procedures should be relied on for adjustment of the dis-
pute. 1 2 In response to this overlap of private contractual rights and
public statutory rights, the NLRB has fashioned a multifaceted defer-
ral policy that delineates the circumstances under which the Board
will withhold its jurisdiction and leave the charging party to its rem-
edy under the contract. 13 Basically, the Board's deferral policy has
three dimensions that reflect the differing procedural contexts in
which the overlap between contractual and statutory forums may
arise: (1) the dispute falls under the scope of the grievance arbitration
clause in the parties' contract, but has not been submitted to those
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement."
4. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (guaranteeing employees the right to organize, bargain
collectively, and "engage in [other] concerted activities, for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection").
5. See NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158; infra note 61 (summarizing the unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8).
6. See NLRA §§ 3, 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160.
7. See LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
8. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
9. See NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158; infra note 61 (summarizing the unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8).
10. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing contractual grievance
resolution procedures).
11. See NLRA § 10(b), (c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), (c). The NLRB is not authorized to act on
its own motion; instead, it must rely on aggrieved employers, unions, or employees to file
charges with one of the Board's regional field offices within six months of a violation. NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 156 (1975). The Board investigates charges and, as
necessary, issues formal complaints, conducts hearings, and issues remedial orders. Id.
12. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-169 and accompanying text.
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procedures or has not proceeded to a resolution through those proce-
dures; 4 (2) the dispute was submitted to grievance arbitration proce-
dures and was settled by the parties or their contractual
representatives during the grievance steps prior to arbitration;' 5 or (3)
the dispute was heard and resolved in a private arbitration
proceeding. 16
This Comment critically examines the manner in which current
Board deferral doctrine accommodates the tension between the Act's
general policy favoring private adjustment of labor disputes and the
Act's specific provisions defining certain labor practices as unfair and
charging the Board with policing those practices. To sketch the insti-
tutional setting and rational underpinnings of federal labor policy,
Section II reviews judicial deferral-a policy fashioned by the
Supreme Court to accommodate a similar tension between the Act's
general policy favoring private resolution and its specific authoriza-
tion of a cause of action in federal court for violations of collective
bargaining agreements. 7 Section III explores the nature and scope of
NLRA unfair labor practice protections and NLRB power as they are
set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Section IV then
surveys the evolution of the Board's deferral policies, and Section V
recommends that the Board distinguish between arbitral adjudica-
tions and non-arbitral grievance settlements. Specifically, this Com-
ment concludes that the Board should retreat from its current
practice of routinely deferring to arbitration awards but should con-
tinue according broad deference to private settlements.
II. JUDICIAL DEFERRAL
A. Overview
The NLRA provides for private-sector employees to organize,
create unions, and collectively bargain with their employers over the
terms and conditions of their employment.' 8 This process, whereby
representatives of management and labor negotiate to establish spe-
cific rights and duties of the parties, has been described as a private
legislative process; the final agreed-upon rules-the collective bar-
gaining agreement-have been likened to a private statutory "law"
that governs the workplace.' 9 Most collective bargaining agreements
14. See infra notes 111-31 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 132-69 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
18. See NLRA §§ 1, 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157.
19. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) ("Congress has seen
19891
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set out a mandatory system of in-house grievance procedures for
resolving disputes that will inevitably arise over the meaning and
application of specific terms in an agreement. 20 Typically, the parties
provide that, should they be unable to reach agreement during the
grievance steps, either party may invoke a final step: submission of
the dispute to a neutral arbitrator who, like a judge, will hear the
dispute, take evidence, and issue a final and binding order in conform-
ity with the controlling "private law" of the parties' collective bar-
gaining agreement. 21
Because the collective bargaining agreement is a contract that is
worked out between the parties under the aegis of public law, issues
arise concerning the legal effect of this private law in the public
courts. For example, is the collective bargaining agreement a contract
between the employer and the union, between the employer and each
employee, or both? Which courts have jurisdiction and what substan-
tive law governs? What effect should be given to a provision for pri-
vate adjudication? Should such a provision be recognized as a
contractual waiver of the statutory right to seek enforcement in a pub-
lic forum? The United States Supreme Court resolved many of these
substantive and jurisdictional issues in the late 1950's and early
1960's. 2 These principal Court opinions reveal the federal labor pol-
icy that underlies both judicial deferral and NLRB deferral to private
enforcement procedures.
B. Nature and Scope of Section 301 Jurisdiction
In Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA),23 Congress provided that "suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties."12 4 Ten years later, in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills," the Supreme Court interpreted this language
as not merely jurisdictional-authorizing federal courts to hear state
law controversies-but as empowering the federal courts to fashion a
fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a
legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents .... ").
20. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 106-09 (3d ed.
1973) (describing the important role of a grievance procedure in the collective bargaining
process).
21. Id. at 107.
22. See infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
23. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
24. Id.
25. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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substantive federal common law applicable to labor relations contro-
versies. 26 Subsequent Court opinions made clear that federal jurisdic-
tion under Section 301 did not oust state court jurisdiction, but state
courts were required to apply substantive federal law.2 7 The broad
interpretation of Section 301 was grounded in the Court's concern
that the congressional purpose in enacting federal labor statutes-
encouraging industrial peace by preventing strikes and lockouts2 8-
would be jeopardized by relying on differing local procedural and sub-
stantive laws for the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments.29 The Court reasoned that an all-embracing federal
substantive law would encourage faithful performance by both par-
ties,3 ° whereas conflicting substantive interpretations of contract
terms under state and federal law would inevitably stimulate and pro-
long disputes in both the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements. 3' The Court further held that collective agreements give
rise to individual rights recognized by public law32 and that claims to
vindicate such rights may be brought either by the individual whose
rights have allegedly been infringed or by the union acting as the indi-
vidual's representative.3
C. Section 301 Deferral
The Lincoln Mills decision created apprehension that judicial
interference would undermine the "private self-government in the
work place" that Congress had intended federal labor law to foster.34
Three years later, however, the Court dispelled this fear by formulat-
ing a policy of judicial deference to the self-governmental processes
set out in collective bargaining agreements. In a series of three cases
commonly referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy,35 the Court held
that courts are not free to review the merits of a workplace dispute if
26. Id. at 456-57. This interpretation was in line with a majority of opinions in the lower
federal courts. Id. at 450 n.2.
27. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101-04 (1962); Charles Dowd
Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-13 (1962).
28. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960).
29. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103.
30. Id. at 103-04.
31. Id.
32. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 198-201 (1962).
33. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699-700 (1966).
34. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663, 688-89 (1973).
35. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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the parties to the dispute have voluntarily provided that such a dis-
pute be resolved through final and binding arbitration.3 6 A court's
role in this situation is limited to determining whether a dispute, on
its face, is one that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.37
Nor, the Court stated, may a court engage in de novo review of the
final decision reached by an arbitrator; a court is simply to determine
whether the arbitrator's decision is premised on either a reasonable
construction of the collective bargaining agreement3 or a reasonable
interpretation of shop "common law" that is not at odds with the
agreement. 39 The Supreme Court admonished that "courts have no
business" substituting their own adjudicative process or judgment for
that which the parties agreed to resort to and accept as final."
°
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,"' the Court expressly
extended its deferral doctrine to actions pressing individual rights
arising under a collective bargaining agreement.4 2 The Court noted
that union prosecution of grievances "complements the union's status
as exclusive bargaining representative by permitting it to participate
actively in the continuing administration of the contract" and that "if
a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its
desirability as a method of settlement. 43
This policy of judicial deference is adequately supported by a
vision of the collective bargaining agreement as contract; when called
upon to enforce a contract, a court should enforce not only the sub-
stantive terms, but also those provisions that delineate the manner in
which the contract is to be administered and disputes are to be
36. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
37. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
38. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597-99.
39. Although the Enterprise decision speaks only about the arbitrator's reliance on the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court's discussion in its companion case,
Warrior & Gulf, makes clear that an arbitrator's source of law includes the common law of the
shop as well as the express provisions of the contract. An arbitral decision anchored in a
reasonable interpretation of the common law of the shop will be recognized as legitimate as
long as it is not at odds with a specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement. See
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578-82.
There is, however, a public policy exception: Courts will not enforce an award that
violates a well-defined public policy, especially if it requires or condones a violation of law. See
Comment, Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in
the Search for a Well-Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767 (1988).
40. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 599.
41. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
42. Id. at 652 ("As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy
requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of
the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of
redress.").
43. Id. at 653.
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resolved. The Steelworkers Trilogy holdings, however, are based on
the much broader vision of collective bargaining as a self-governmen-
tal process.' The Court noted that the periodic drafting of a collec-
tive agreement expressly setting out a limited number of rights and
obligations is just one aspect of collective bargaining's larger ongoing
role of preventing and resolving conflicts that give rise to strikes and
lockouts.45 Because "[t]here are too many people, too many
problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of
the contract the exclusive source of rights and duties,"46 the specific
agreement is merely a "generalized code"47 that "calls into being...
the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."48
The essence of the "contract" between the parties to a collective
agreement is their promise to resort to agreed-upon procedures for
settling disputes within the framework of their particular agreement
and the larger "common law" that has developed around their rela-
tionship under the agreement.49 Therefore, "the judicial inquiry
under § 301 [authorizing court enforcement of the 'contract'] must be
strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree
to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to
make the award he made."5 Further, the promise to resort to inter-
nal procedures would be quickly undermined if public law did not
give "full play" to the agreed-upon private procedures" or "if courts
had the final say on the merits of the [decisions reached through these
procedures]."52
D. Scope of Deferral Under Section 301
The Steelworkers Trilogy cases arose in the context of traditional
44. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960).
45. Id. at 578-80.
46. Id. at 579 (quoting Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1498-99 (1959)).
47. Id. at 578.
48. Id. at 579-80.
49. Id. at 580. The Court observed that the parties are compelled to have a relationship.
Id. Consequently, the choice to be negotiated is whether their relationship will be "governed
by an agreed-upon rule of law" or whether "each and every matter [will be left] subject to a
temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative strength, at any given moment, of the
contending forces." Id.
50. Id. at 582. Further, the court must expansively construe provisions that provide for
grievance arbitration. "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage." Id. at 582-83.
51. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
52. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
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grievance arbitration procedures, and courts have generally read the
decisions as specifically endorsing arbitration. There is nothing
expressly stated in the opinions or implicit in their rationale, however,
that limits these holdings exclusively to arbitration. Section 203(d) of
the LMRA,53 cited by the Steelworkers Trilogy Court,54 speaks only of
"a method agreed upon by the parties."" In particular, the Court
said nothing concerning either the arbitrator's neutral status or the
court-like adjudicatory processes used by the arbitrator. The essence
of the Court's deferral rationale is built around a distinction between
federal judges, who are far removed from the life of the shop, and
arbitrators, whose judgment is informed by the needs of the shop and
by the relevant "common law" of the industry. 6 Because the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement presumably would not provide
for other non-arbitral "insiders" to make binding adjudications unless
those insiders were believed to possess equally informed judgment, the
Court's deferral rationale logically extends to any form of agreed-
upon procedures for dispute resolution. In accordance with this rea-
soning, three years after the Steelworkers Trilogy opinions, the
Supreme Court expressly extended its deferral policy to non-arbitral
awards reached in accordance with procedures set out as final and
binding under a collective agreement. 7 This rationale also supports
deferral to non-arbitral settlements reached during the pre-arbitration
stages of the grievance process," and courts have held that these set-
53. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
54. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 566.
55. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
56. The Supreme Court has explained:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal
judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract
as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular
grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a
particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in
using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of
uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement serve
their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same
experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
57. General Drivers v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963) ("It is not enough that the
word 'arbitration' does not appear in the collective bargaining agreement ....").
58. Litigation arises in this context only when one party attempts to renege on the
grievance settlement or when an individual employee whose rights are affected is unhappy with
the settlement worked out between the union, as his representative, and the employer. The
courts have fashioned a duty of fair representation that requires the union to represent all
[Vol. 44:341
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tlements also bar judicial adjudication. 9
III. NLRA RIGHTS AND NLRB POWER
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act 60 sets forth certain
employer and union conduct as "unfair labor practices,"'" and Sec-
tion 1062 empowers the NLRB to prevent and remedy such practices.
Deferral issues arise when the party charged with an unfair labor
practice-a statutory violation-defends its actions as conduct
authorized by the private law of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and the agreement provides for arbitration of disputes aris-
ing under the contract. There are three sets of allegations that most
frequently create deferral situations. First, the union may charge that
the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by disciplining employees in
retaliation for legitimate union activities; meanwhile, the employer
contends that the discipline was for "just cause" under the contract.
Second, the union may allege that the employer violated Section
8(a)(3) by discriminating against union officers in conditions of
employment, and the employer defends on the basis that its discrimi-
natory treatment was authorized by the agreement. Third, the union
employees fairly. Under this doctrine, if an employee shows that the union breached its duty
to fairly represent his interests, the court will withhold deferral and scrutinize the employee's
rights under the contract. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); see also Tidwell, Major Issues in the Duty of Fair
Representation Cases Since 1977, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 383 (1985) (development of the
judicially-created duty of fair representation).
59. See, e.g., Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966);
Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 884 (1965);
Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963).
60. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
61. Practices specifically proscribed by Section 8(a) are: (1) interfering with employees'
exercise of their Section 7 rights to "engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157; (2)
dominating or interfering with the formation or administration of a union, or contributing
financial or other support; (3) discriminating with regard to hire or conditions of employment
based on membership in the union; (4) discharging or discriminating against an employee in
retaliation for exercising rights related to unfair labor practices; and (5) refusing to bargain
collectively with employee representatives. See NLRA § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
Similarly, Section 8(b) prohibits the following union conduct: (1) interfering with
employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights; (2) causing or attempting to cause an employer to
discriminate with regard to hire or conditions of employment based on membership in the
union; (3) refusing to bargain collectively with the employer; (4) engaging in or inducing an
unlawful strike; (5) forcing an employee to join a union; (6) requiring an employer to bargain
with a union that has not been certified; (7) requiring an employer to bargain where another
union has already been certified; (8) forcing an employer to assign work to employees in a
particular union; (9) requiring excessive or discriminatory membership dues; and (10)
requiring an employer to pay for services not performed. See NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b).
62. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160.
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might accuse the employer of violating Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
bargain prior to making unilateral changes in operating practices,
wage rates, or other terms and conditions of employment, and the
employer maintains that its actions were authorized under the man-
agement rights clause of the collective agreement.
A. Preemptive Public Rights
In two 1940 opinions, Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co. 63 and National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,64 the Supreme
Court declared that the NLRA unfair labor practice protections cre-
ated public rights to protect the public interest in the prevention of
labor disputes, rather than private rights to protect individual
employees through private remedies.65 Moreover, interpreting Sec-
tion 10(a)'s provision that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor
practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise,"66 the Court found that Congress entrusted the Board with
exclusive jurisdiction to vindicate the public rights of Section 8.67
Thus, with respect to unfair labor practices, the Act does not confer
upon private parties a cause of action in federal court, state court, or
any tribunal other than the NLRB.68
In a subsequent series of opinions represented by San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,69 the Court not only proclaimed
that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the public rights of
63. 309 U.S. 261 (1940). In Amalgamated Utility Workers, the Court dismissed an action
brought by a union seeking to enforce an NLRB remedial order against the employer. The
Court reasoned that because the Board acts on behalf of the public interest in order to
vindicate "public" rather than "private" rights, the Board's orders issue on behalf of the public
rather than on behalf of the charging parties. Id. at 269. Enforcement therefore falls within
the Board's exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute unfair labor practice charges. Id. at 269-70.
64. 309 U.S. 350 (1940). In National Licorice, the Court upheld a Board order that
prohibitted an employer from enforcing individual employment contracts which employees
had been pressured into entering in violation of the Act. Id. at 355-56, 369. In response to the
employer's contention that the Board was without power to nullify private contractual rights
of employees who were not parties to the proceedings, the Court explained that Board
proceedings do not adjudicate private rights. Id. at 362. Thus, the Board's order was directed
to, and effective against, only the employer; the order did not invalidate or otherwise interfere
with the employees' rights under the contracts. Id. at 364-66.
65. Id. at 362; Amalgamated Util. Workers, 309 U.S. at 268-70.
66. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
67. National Licorice, 309 U.S. at 365; Amalgamated Util. Workers, 309 U.S. at 264-66.
68. Amalgamated Util. Workers, 309 U.S. at 265-67. Note, however, that Section 10(f) of
the Act provides that any person aggrieved by a final Board order may seek judicial review in a
federal court of appeals. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
69. 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955);
Garner v. Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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Section 8, but it also added that the rights themselves are exclusive.
In fact, they preempt any rights under state law, whether private or
public, that act to regulate activities arguably protected by Section 7
or proscribed by Section 8.70 The Act's broad preemptive scope
extends even to remedies, thereby limiting any enforcement of non-
labor state laws in a manner that impacts upon labor relations.71
Moreover, federal preemption is effective even if the NLRB declines
to exercise its own jurisdiction.72
B. Accommodation with Section 301 Jurisdiction
In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.," a case decided
three years after Garmon, the defendant-employer in a Section 301
action attempted to apply the preemption doctrine to private contrac-
tual regulation. The employer argued that when conduct allegedly
breaching a contract arguably constitutes a breach of the Act as well,
the preemptive force of Section 10 ousts court jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 301 and requires that the controversy be presented to the
NLRB. 74 The Supreme Court summarily dismissed this argument,
holding that the preemption doctrine of Garmon was "not relevant"
in a Section 301 dispute.75 The Court noted, however, that:
conduct which is a violation of a contractual obligation may also
be conduct constituting an unfair labor practice, and [the conclu-
sion that violations of the agreement are within the purview of Sec-
tion 301 rather than under the jurisdiction of the Board] is not to
imply that enforcement by a court of a contract obligation affects
the jurisdiction of the NLRB to remedy the unfair labor practices,
as such.76
Later that same year, the Court in Smith v. Evening News Associa-
tion 7 7 further elaborated 'Upon the relationship between NLRB juris-
diction under Section 10 and court jurisdiction under Section 301.
The Court reaffirmed its holding that a Section 301 action on the col-
70. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-47; Weber, 348 U.S. at 481; Garner, 346 U.S. at 500-01.
71. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244, 247; Weber, 348 U.S. at 480.
72. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353
U.S. 1 (1957).
73. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id. at.101 n.9.
76. Id. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the Court noted that
Congress had rejected a Senate proposal that would have made all contract violations unfair
labor practices. Id. at 510-11. Due to the congressional creation of Section 301 jurisdiction,
the Court. reasoned that Congress had intentionally denied the Board direct enforcement
power over collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 513.
77. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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lective bargaining agreement is not preempted merely because the
alleged conduct also makes out an unfair labor practice charge.78 On
the other hand, the Court more forcefully acknowledged that the
Board's authority to adjudicate the unfair labor practice is not
destroyed merely because the conduct violates the contract or has
been the subject matter of an arbitration award.79 Subsequently, in
NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., ° the Court confirmed the Board's
authority to interpret a collective agreement to the extent necessary to
decide an unfair labor practice charge.8" The Court grounded its
holding in administrative efficiency. 2 If, the Court reasoned, the
Board were not empowered to interpret an agreement but instead had
to wait for the charging party to institute a Section 301 action so that
an authoritative interpretation could then be shuttled back to the
NLRB proceeding, years would likely be added to the already lengthy
period required to adjudicate unfair labor practice disputes.8 3
These Court pronouncements, setting out the relationship
between the NLRB's jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices and
the courts' Section 301 jurisdiction, followed directly on the heels of
the Steelworkers Trilogy8 4 the three cases in which the Court enunci-
ated a judicial deferral policy that rendered Section 301 jurisdiction
virtually synonymous with grievance arbitration. 5 Presumably,
therefore, the Court also intended that Lucas Flour, Evening News
Association, and C & C Plywood set out an accommodation between
contractual grievance arbitration procedures and the NLRB. In those
instances where alleged wrongful conduct makes out both an unfair
labor practice and a violation of a collective bargaining agreement,
grievance arbitration procedures do not displace NLRB jurisdiction.
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id.
80. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
81. Id. at 429-30. Later, in NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969), the Court expressly
extended the Board's authority to interpret and enforce collective bargaining agreements to the
extent required to design and enforce appropriate make-whole remedial orders. Id. at 361.
82. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. at 429-30. Interestingly, the Court relied solely on these
practical considerations and failed to cite Section 10(a)'s provision that the Board's power to
prevent and remedy unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise." NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
83. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. at 429-30. In another context, the NLRB had suggested that
an arbitral tribunal or court might refer statutory questions to the Board for determination.
At least one Justice rejected this idea as impractical and inefficient, "[d]ividing into two what
should be a single proceeding" and extending even further the already lengthy delays
experienced in resolving unfair labor practice disputes. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195, 203 n.5 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
84. See supra note 35.
85. See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
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Nor, however, does NLRB jurisdiction prevent the parties from tak-
ing the dispute to grievance arbitration. As the Court later summa-
rized these holdings, "in some circumstances the authority of the
Board and the law of the contract are overlapping, concurrent
regimes, neither preempting the other." 6
IV. NLRB DEFERRAL POLICIES
A. Early Deferral
From its inception, the Board determined to exercise its unfair
labor practice jurisdiction in a discretionary manner consistent with
the Act's basic purpose of encouraging private adjustment of labor
disputes through collective bargaining.87 In North American Aviation,
Inc. 18 -decided five years prior to the 1947 LMRA amendments
which created Section 301 jurisdiction8 9 and eighteen years prior to
the Supreme Court's Steelworkers Trilogy 9° opinions which inter-
preted those amendments-the Board articulated a similar broad
vision of collective bargaining as being virtually synonymous with
self-government in the workplace. 9' The following year, in Consoli-
dated Aircraft Corp.,92 the Board announced a policy of deferral to
"contractual machinery for the settlement of disputes" under which
the Board would refuse to exercise its unfair labor practice jurisdic-
tion "where the parties have not exhausted their rights and remedies
86. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360 (1969). It bears noting that these holdings are
consistent with the Court's view that engendered the doctrine of NLRB preemption in the first
instance: The rights of Section 8 constitute public rights, distinct and separate from any
private rights arising under a collective bargaining agreement. See supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
87. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955); Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,
47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943); see also infra note 178 (major Board decisions citing Steelworkers
Trilogy opinions for support).
88. 44 N.L.R.B. 604 (1942).
89. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
91. North American Aviation, 44 N.L.R.B. at 612. In rejecting an employer's contention
that Section 9(a) of the Act allows individual bargaining over grievances, the Board observed:
[Tihe process of collective bargaining [is not] complete upon the execution of a
contract. After a contract has been negotiated and executed, it is continuously
modified and supplemented by interpretations and precedents made by employer
and employees from day to day in the course of their operations under the
contract. This interpretation of the contract, no less than its negotiation,
constitutes an integral part of the collective bargaining process.
44 N.L.R.B. at 612 (citing C. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 450
(rev. ed. 1948); C. GOLDEN & H. RuTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOC-
RACY 43 (1942)).
92. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
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under the contract. 93
B. Post-Arbitral Deferral
Despite the policy enunciated in Consolidated Aircraft, the Board
was subsequently presented with several cases in which the circum-
stances of a prior arbitral ruling rendered deferral inappropriate.94 In
1955, the Board set forth more precise guidelines for its post-arbitral
deferral policy in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,9 a decision that has
since served as the touchstone of NLRB deferral doctrine. The Board
announced that it would give binding effect to an arbitration ruling
where three conditions were met: "the proceedings appear to have
been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the
decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the pur-
poses and policies of the Act."96 Six years later, in Monsanto Chemi-
cal Co.,97 the Board reiterated its intent to promote the Act's general
policy of encouraging voluntary adjustment of labor disputes.98 The
Board acknowledged, however, its specific obligations to protect
rights that the Act guarantees. 99 In fact, the Board grafted a fourth
threshold standard to the Spielberg criteria: An arbitration award
must "purport to resolve the unfair labor practice issue ... [that] the
Board is called upon to decide.'
Since Monsanto, most of the debate concerning the NLRB's post-
arbitral deferral policy has centered on the threshold criteria:
whether the arbitrator adequately considered and resolved the unfair
labor practice issue. This, in turn, has varied with the philosophical
views of the Board's members. At one pro-deferral extreme, Elec-
tronic Reproduction,10 1 the Board held that it would defer to an arbi-
trator's ruling whenever the charging party had an opportunity at the
arbitration proceeding to present evidence relevant to the unfair labor
93. Id. at 705-06. The Consolidated Aircraft opinion did not distinguish among deferral to
the grievance arbitration process, deferral to an arbitration award, and deferral to voluntary
settlements reached in the collective bargaining process prior to arbitration. See infra notes
111-14 & 132-35 and accompanying text.
94. Wertheimer Stores Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954) (arbitration conducted over the
opposition of the affected employee); Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1951)
(arbitration award at odds with the Act), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953); Walt Disney
Prods., 48 N.L.R.B. 892 (1943) (discriminatory discharge), enforced, 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945).
95. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
96. Id. at 1082.
97. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
98. Id. at 1098.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1099.
101. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
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practice issue, even if no evidence had actually been presented. 10 2
This standard was grounded in the Board's belief that requiring actual
presentation of evidence encouraged union and employee complain-
ants to deliberately withhold evidence as a means of circumventing
deferral.103 At the other extreme, the Board held in Suburban Motor
Freight °1 that opportunity alone was not sufficient. The Board
would not defer to an arbitral ruling unless evidence related to the
statutory issue was presented, considered, and ruled on by the
arbitrator. 105
The Board's most recent policy statement on post-arbitral defer-
ral was presented in 1984 in Olin Corp. 106 In Olin, the Board again
affirmed the Spielberg criteria,10 7 but it adopted as a threshold stan-
dard only that: (1) the unfair labor practice issue must be "factually
parallel" to the contractual issues decided by the arbitrator, and (2)
the arbitrator must be presented "with the facts relevant to resolving
the unfair labor practice. "18 "[D]ifferences, if any, between the con-
tractual and statutory standards of review should be weighed by the
Board as part of its determination ... whether an award is 'clearly
repugnant' to the Act."' 0 9 Further, rather than requiring that an
arbitrator's determination be "totally consistent with Board prece-
dent," the Board stated that it would defer unless a ruling is "palpa-
bly wrong" or "not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with
the Act."' 10
C. Pre-Arbitral Deferral
The Board's pre-arbitral deferral policy has also shifted with the
makeup of the Board. The early Consolidated Aircraft1 ' deferral
decision included two alleged Section 8(a)(5) "refusal to bargain" vio-
102. Id. at 762.
103. Id. at 760-62.
104. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
105. Id. at 146-47. The decision expressly overruled Electronic Reproduction, stating that
experience under that standard "ha[d] led to the conclusion that it promotes the statutory
purpose of encouraging collective-bargaining relationships, but derogates the equally
important purpose of protecting employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the
Act." Id. at 146.
106. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
107. Id. at 573-74.
108. Id. at 574. The dissenting opinion pointed out that because it would be extremely
difficult to show that the facts relevant to the contract issue were not presented to the
arbitrator, the two-factor test is really a single-step "factually parallel" test. Id. at 579
(Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
109. Id. at 574.
110. Id.
111. Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943); see supra notes 92-93.
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lations that had not yet been submitted to the parties' grievance arbi-
tration procedures. Noting that the unsettled issues were purely
matters of contract interpretation and that there was no evidence of
employer hostility toward the union with respect to the arbitration of
these issues,'12 the Board persuasively defended its deferral decision
with an argument much like that used by the Supreme Court to justify
judicial deferral of Section 301 jurisdiction.' " The Board then sum-
marily added two alleged Section 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge
violations into the same deferral decision without in any manner
addressing the distinctions that the Section 8(a)(3) charges were not
solely contractual issues and that they did suggest employer hostility
to the union's statutory rights.'1 4
Thereafter, the Board practiced pre-arbitral deferral inconsis-
tently and without clear guidelines' until 1971, when it formally
reannounced a policy of pre-arbitral deferral in Collyer Insulated
Wire." 16 Although the reasoning of Collyer focused on the particular
situation involved-no showing of employer enmity' 17 and disputed
contractual provisions that were dispositive of the unfair labor prac-
tice charges' 1--dicta in Collyer suggested that the Board's pre-arbi-
tral deferral policy would extend to any situation in which it was
likely that an arbitrator's ruling on the contractual issues would con-
112. Consolidated Aircraft, 47 N.L.R.B. at 705 (contractual interpretations involved shift
operations and job classifications).
113. Id. at 705-06. The Board explained:
[I]t will not effectuate the statutory policy of "encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining" for the Board to assume the role of policing
collective contracts between employers and labor organizations by attempting to
decide whether disputes as to the meaning and administration of such contracts
constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. On the contrary, we believe that
parties to collective contracts would thereby be encouraged to abandon their
efforts to dispose of disputes under the contracts through collective bargaining or
through the settlement procedures mutually agreed upon by them ....
Id. at 706. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's judicial deferral rationale, see supra notes
35-52 and accompanying text.
114. Consolidated Aircraft, 47 N.L.R.B. at 706-07. The Board did not distinguish between
the contractual charges and the statutory allegations, dismissing both due to the union's failure
to "utilize ... [available] contractual machinery for the settlement of the disputes." Id. at 705-
07. At the time, the Board apparently viewed its jurisdiction as extending to all contract
violations on the theory that the unilateral implementation of a disputed contractual
interpretation constituted a Section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain violation. Id. Thus, the Board
did not disclaim its power to intervene in the administration of contracts, but it instead
phrased the decision in terms of a voluntary withholding of jurisdiction as a matter of policy.
Id.
115. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841 (1971).
116. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
117. Id. at 842.
118. Id. at 839 (unilateral changes in certain wages and working conditions).
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currently resolve associated statutory issues in a manner compatible
with the purposes of the Act." 9
The following year, in National Radio Co. ,120 the Board expressly
extended pre-arbitral deferral to Section 8(a)(3) discriminatory dis-
charge complaints. The Board acknowledged that the circumstances
of a Section 8(a)(3) violation were distinguishable from Collyer
because it was possible that the employer's conduct could be sanc-
tioned by the contract, yet motivated by union animus and thus viola-
tive of the Act. 12 ' Nevertheless, noting its obligation to seek a
"rational accommodation" between the statutory and contractual
forums provided by the Act, 122 the Board held that it would require
parties to take such disputes to grievance arbitration. 23 Either party
could subsequently seek vindication of its statutory rights if the arbi-
trator's resolution was not consistent with the Spielberg standards.
24
Thereafter, the Board continued to defer in Section 8(a)(1) and Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) pre-arbitral situations, 2 ' until it abruptly changed course
five years later in General American Transportation Corp.12 6 There, a
majority of the Board argued that deferral of Section 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) charges constituted an abdication of the Board's Section 10
duty to investigate and remedy unfair labor practices. 127 Without
expressly specifying new standards for a more limited pre-arbitral
119. Id. at 841-42. The Board noted that in the case of pre-arbitral deferral, it retained
jurisdiction for the limited purpose of entertaining a possible post-arbitral motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that the arbitrator's ruling did not satisfy the Spielberg criteria
for deferral to an arbitral award. Id. at 843.
120. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
121. Id. at 530.
122. Id. at 531.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv., 210 N.L.R.B. 560 (1974); Jemco, 203 N.L.R.B.
305 (1973); United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879 (1973), enforced sub nom. Lodges 700,
743, 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
126. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
127. Id. at 808. In a concurring opinion, Chairman Murphy explained:
In cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(5) .... based on conduct assertedly in
derogation of the contract, the principal issue is whether the complained-of
conduct is permitted by the parties' contract. Such issues are eminently suited to
the arbitral process, and resolution of the contract issue by an arbitrator will, as a
rule, dispose of the unfair labor practice issue. On the other hand, in cases
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), [and] (a)(3). . . . although arguably also
involving a contract violation, the determinative issue is not whether the conduct
is permitted by the contract, but whether the conduct was unlawfully motivated
or whether it otherwise interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. In these
situations, an arbitrator's resolution of the contract issue will not dispose of the
unfair labor practice allegation.
Id. at 810-11 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
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deferral practice, the Board suggested that the original Collyer guide-
lines-requiring a purely contractual issue and no union animus-
were appropriate deferral criteria. 28
The Board's latest statement on pre-arbitral deferral, enunciated
in United Technologies Corp.,"' overrules General American Trans-
portation and purports to "resurrect" the standards of Collyer and
National Radio.1 30 Because the charges deferred in United Technolo-
gies included allegations that the employer threatened an employee
with retaliation if she persisted in processing a grievance, 131 however,
the current deferral policy appears to have dropped the National
Radio exception for disputes that involve a claim of employer animus
toward employees' exercise of Section 7 rights.
D. Deferral to Grievance Settlement
In Consolidated Aircraft,132 the Board dismissed several Section
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain charges because they had been "amicably
settled as a result of ... collective bargaining between the parties."' 33
In addition, the Board noted that a retaliatory discharge claim under
Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) "was settled to the mutual satisfaction
of the parties through collective bargaining," and the Board saw "no
reason under the ... circumstances for interfering with this [griev-
ance] settlement."' 34 The Board's announced rationale for deferral-
"encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing"1 35-neither expressly nor impliedly suggested that deferral is
appropriate only when settlements involve arbitral adjudication.
When the Board later promulgated more formal deferral criteria
in Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 136 and Monsanto Chemical Co. ," it
continued to view grievance settlements and arbitration awards as
presenting similar deferral considerations. 138 As the general Spielberg
criteria were fleshed out by application to specific cases, however, a
128. Id. at 809.
129. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
130. Id. at 558-60.
131. Id. at 564 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
132. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943); see supra notes 92-93.
133. Consolidated Aircraft, 47 N.L.R.B. at 705.
134. Id. at 707 n.15.
135. Id. at 706.
136. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
137. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961); see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
138. For example, in Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1958),
the Board refused to defer to a settlement agreement and stated that "as a matter of practice,
the Board has exercised its discretion and refused to be bound by any settlement agreement or
arbitration award where such settlement agreement or award was at odds with the Act or the
Board's policies"; the Board then cited three arbitral opinions. Id. at 1495.
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substantive distinction emerged between the Board's arbitral deferral
policy and its deferral policy for non-arbitral grievance settlements.
When reviewing arbitral awards, on the one hand, the Board stressed
its desire to effectuate the Act's general policy of encouraging the vol-
untary adjustment of labor disputes. 39  Accordingly, the Board
applied Spielberg in a manner that gave minimal scrutiny to arbitral
awards. When reviewing non-arbitral grievance settlements, on the
other hand, the Board emphasized its specific statutory duty to pro-
tect employees' Section 7 rights.' 4° Consequently, the Board recast
the basic Spielberg concepts into a potpourri of requirements that
resulted in a close screening of settlements in order to assure proper
individual remedies. At the extreme end of this screening, the Board
interpreted "fair and regular" as obliging an outright rejection of
deferral when a grievance settlement was reached without the aid of
an arbitrator or other impartial tribunal.1 4 1 In analyzing whether
affected employees had agreed to be bound, the Board looked to such
factors as whether the employees had originally agreed to the settle-
ment, 1 42 whether any present controversy existed concerning the
intended terms and application of the agreement, 43 whether employ-
ees had made voluntary, clear, and knowing waivers of their rights to
process a claim with the Board,'44 and even whether all of the parties
remained willing to abide by the agreement.' 45 The Board character-
ized settlement agreements as repugnant to the Act when they failed
to provide remedies substantially similar to what the Board would
normally award. 46  Finally, in order to be deemed adequately
139. See supra notes 95-131 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
141. See United States Postal Serv., 237 N.L.R.B. 117, 120 (1978); Owens Coming
Fiberglas Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 479, 479 n.4 (1978); T & T Indus., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 517, 517
n.2 (1978); Ford Motor Co. (Rouge Complex), 233 N.L.R.B. 698, 700 n.12 (1977); General
Motors Corp., Inland Div., 233 N.L.R.B. 47, 51 (1977); Whirlpool Corp., Evansville Div., 216
N.L.R.B. 183, 186 (1975); Pontiac Motors Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 413, 415
(1961).
142. United States Steel Corp., 250 N.L.R.B. 387 (1980); Ford Motor Co. (Rouge
Complex), 233 N.L.R.B. 698 (1977).
143. Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 174, 175 (1979), enforcement denied, 647 F.2d
415 (4th Cir. 1981) (on factual rather than legal grounds); Central Cartage Co., 206 N.L.R.B.
337, 338 (1973).
144. Member Truesdale, concurring in Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. at 175-76,
construed such a requirement from the Board's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 243
N.L.R.B. 501 (1979). See also United States Steel Corp., 250 N.L.R.B. 387, 390 (1980)
(distinguishing Central Cartage on the grounds that the settlement contained no written
provision that the already filed Section 8(a)(3) charge would be withdrawn).
145. Central Cartage, 206 N.L.R.B. at 338. This is a relevant criterion when the settlement
is reached after charges are filed with the Board and the General Counsel argues against
deferral.
146. American Cyanamid Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 440, 442 (1978); Owens Coming Fiberglas
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resolved and considered, settlement discussions had to have directly
addressed the statutory issues and passed on the legality of the
employer's conduct. 147
The Board's Airport Parking Management '41 decision consoli-
dated these diverse case law holdings into three specific criteria for
NLRB deferral to grievance settlements: (1) the unfair labor practice
issues must be clearly presented and discussed during the settlement
discussions; 49 (2) the remedy provided by the settlement must sub-
stantially conform with the Board's usual remedy for a similar viola-
tion, or constitute a reasonable remedy for disputed claims; 50 and (3)
the parties to the agreement must explicitly understand and intend
that the agreement include settlement of the statutory claims. 5 ' The
effect of these stringent requirements was that the Board only infre-
quently deferred to settlements reached through the grievance pro-
cess, in marked contrast to its almost automatic deferral to arbitral
resolutions.' 52 By focusing in the former case on the Act's specific
provision that the Board protect Section 7 rights, and in the latter
situation on the Act's general policy promoting internal adjustment of
labor disputes, the Board translated the Spielberg concerns into two
distinct sets of criteria.
The Board abruptly changed course in 1985 when it chose to
defer to a grievance settlement in Alpha Beta Co.'53 Noting that the
principles and purposes that motivate arbitral deferral-encouraging
parties to utilize their contractual dispute-settlement machinery-
apply equally to grievance settlements, 5 4 the Board announced that it
would henceforth apply the same deferral tests to grievance settle-
ments that it applies to arbitration awards.'55 Furthermore, consis-
tent with its goal of "evenhanded deference to the deferral
Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 479, 479 n.4 (1978); Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 121 N.L.R.B.
1492, 1495 (1958).
147. United States Steel, 250 N.L.R.B. at 390; Roadway Express, 246 N.L.R.B. at 175;
Owens Corning Fiberglas, 236 N.L.R.B. at 479; Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 224 N.L.R.B.
941 (1976); Central Cartage, 206 N.L.R.B. at 338.
148. 264 N.L.R.B. 5 (1982), enforced, 720 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1983).
149. Airport Parking Management v. NLRB, 720 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1983).
150. Id. at 616.
151. Id. at 617.
152. See supra notes 95-131 and accompanying text.
153. 273 N.L.R.B. 1546 (1985), enforced sub nom. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th
Cir. 1987). The decision issued shortly after the Board had similarly extended its deferral
practices in Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), and United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
154. Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547.
155. Id. The decision was rendered by a three member panel that acknowledged that it was
adopting the views expressed earlier by Member Penello in his dissent to Roadway Express,
Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 174, 176-77 (1979) (Penello, Member, dissenting).
[Vol. 44:341
NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY
process,"' 156 the Board applied the Spielberg criteria to grievance set-
tlements in the same broad manner as it had earlier applied these cri-
teria to arbitral awards in Olin.'57 In doing so, the Board effectively
nullified the Spielberg criteria as grounds for rejecting a settlement
that was reached in the context of agreed-upon grievance procedures.
The Board's opinion equated "fair and regular" with having been
reached through contractual grievance procedures,"'8 held that a col-
lective bargaining representative's acceptance of a settlement consti-
tutes sufficient "agreement to be bound,"' 59 and proclaimed it
unlikely that settlements reached within contractual grievance arbi-
tration procedures are "palpably wrong." 16°
The Board was less expansive, however, in its application of the
threshold "considered and resolved" criterion. Although it seems
that the Board could simply have relied on the "factually parallel"
test of Olin,1 6 1 the Board instead focused on the union officials' waiver
of the statutory claims:
It is clear that the settlement agreement was intended to resolve
the parties' contractual dispute over the discharge of employees
who failed to report for work in connection with a sympathy strike.
To resolve this contractual dispute, the Union could-if they felt it
necessary-waive the employees' statutory rights. The terms of
this agreement suggest that both the Respondents and the Unions
made concessions in order to settle the grievances without going to
arbitration ... 62
The kernel of this change in policy-that individual remedial entitle-
ments can be waived by bargaining representatives in the grievance
stages of collective bargaining and that employees are bound by such
settlements wholly apart from their own separate consent-has since
been supported by two court of appeals decisions.' 63
156. Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547 (paraphrasing Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 576).
157. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573-74; see supra note 106.
158. Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547.
159. Id. Although the Board noted that in this particular case the affected employees had
personally authorized acceptance of the agreement, it held that "the employees were bound by
their (own] acts and those of their collective-bargaining representative." Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
162. Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547 (citation omitted).
163. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987); Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde v.
NLRB, 723 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1983). In Mahon, the Ninth Circuit enforced the Alpha Beta
decision, holding that "the union [is] empowered to conclusively bind ... employees to the
terms of [a] settlement agreement[] [w]holly apart from their own separate consents." Mahon,
808 F.2d at 1345. In Hotel Holiday Inn, the First Circuit remanded a Board decision, Hotel
Holiday Inn de Isla Verde, 265 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1982) (issued prior to Alpha Beta), for a
reexamination of its ruling not to defer to a strike settlement agreement on the grounds that
"[a] Union and an employer may not restrict an individual's right to reinstatement by
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The Board's recent Spann Building Maintenance Co. '6 decision
suggests that the Board will continue to require some substantive dis-
cussion and resolution within the channels of the grievance proce-
dures as a threshold criterion for deferral to grievance settlements. In
Spann, the union entered into grievance discussions in response to a
suspension and discharge of an employee, and it initially rejected the
employer's settlement offer. 65 When the employer unilaterally rein-
stated the employee, however, the union refused to proceed to arbitra-
tion and wrote the employer that it "consider[ed] the matter as
settled."' 66 When the employee later filed unfair labor practice
charges, the employer argued that the Board should defer pursuant to
the policy enunciated in Alpha Beta. ' 67 The Board declined to defer,
however, noting that the reinstatement arrangement was neither
negotiated by the union nor accepted by the affected employee as a
settlement of all contractual and statutory issues arising from the inci-
dent. 68 The Board further explained that the mere fact "[tihat the
Union some 4-1/2 years later now states that it considers the matter
settled because [the employee] was reinstated does not retroactively
change the nature of the ... arrangement ... and transform it into a
settlement." 69
V. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the 1940's, the Supreme Court declared that the rights
afforded under Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA are public rights,
enacted to effect the public interest in encouraging and protecting col-
negotiating more stringent terms of reinstatement for them than those available under existing
law." Hotel Holiday Inn, 723 F.2d at 172-73. In its subsequent decision on remand, Hotel
Holiday Inn de Isla Verde, 278 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1986), the Board reversed its position, agreeing
with the First Circuit's view that requiring substantial compliance with a Board remedy
presupposes that the Board would have found an unfair labor practice:
"All of the uncertainties of an adversary hearing, i.e., the competence of counsel,
the thoroughness of preparation, the memories of witnesses, the attitudes of the
hearing officer, and the availability of witnesses, stood between [the individual
employees] and [a board remedy].". . . [T]he union probably perceived a
settlement agreement which provided for some remedy as more desirous than the
gamble of a more enhanced remedy at the end of the potentially long and costly
litigation.
Id. at 1028 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hotel Holiday Inn, 723 F.2d at 172-73).
164. 289 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 130 LR.R.M. (BNA) 1013 (1988).




169. Id. at 1014-15. The opinion does not address the apparent loophole that the decision
opens in the Board's pre-arbitral deferral policy.
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lective bargaining. 7 ° Moreover, the Court stated that these statutory
rights are distinct and separate from the private rights of a collective
bargaining agreement' and that the NLRB is the exclusive tribunal
with power to vindicate the statutory rights.172 In the 1950's, the
Court added that the rights themselves are exclusive, preempting state
regulation of conduct arguably encompassed by Sections 7 and 8.173
When the Court later held that the statutory rights did not preempt
labor and management from creating and enforcing private rights in
this area through collective bargaining, 17  it expressly chose not to
retreat from its earlier interpretation that the Board possesses super-
seding and exclusive power over unfair labor practices. 75 Thus, the
Supreme Court accommodated the tension between the Act's general
policy of encouraging collective bargaining and its specific provisions
entrusting the Board with the prevention of unfair labor practices by
suggesting that the exercise of independent contractual power would
have little impact on the Board's exercise of its statutorily mandated
function to investigate and remedy alleged unfair labor practices.
This Supreme Court accommodation poses a challenge to the
accommodation embodied in current NLRB arbitral and pre-arbitral
deferral policy. Under the Board's policy, when alleged wrongful
conduct makes out both a violation of the Act and a breach of the
labor contract, the charging party must initially seek an "adjustment"
under the contract.7 6  In the absence of unusual circumstances, the
Board will review an arbitrator's adjustment only if the charging
party can show that the facts relevant to the statutory issue were not
presented during the arbitral proceedings. 77 The Board's deferral
policy thereby effectively transfers to arbitrators the adjudicative
170. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940); Amalgamated Util.
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1940); see supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
171. "The rights asserted in the [unfair labor practice] suit and those arising upon the
contract are distinct and separate .... " National Licorice, 309 U.S. at 363.
172. Id. at 365 ("Section 10(a) and (c) of the Act commits to the Board the exclusive power
6-fecide whether unfair labor practices have been committed and to determine the action [a
violator] must take to remove or avoid the consequences of his unfair labor practice.");
Amalgamated Util. Workers, 309 U.S. at 266. ("The vindication of the desired freedom of
employees is thus confided by the Act, by reason of the recognized public interest, to the public
agency the Act creates.").
173. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. Note that the relevant "law" applied by
the Board might be affected by express waivers of the statutory protections. See infra notes
195-97 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 95-110 & 115-31 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
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functions that the Act, and apparently the Court, reserved to the
Board.
A. Contrasts with Section 301 Deferral
The Board anchors its deferral policy in the same rationale that
the Supreme Court articulated to support judicial deferral of Section
301 jurisdiction.178 A number of clear and important distinctions
exist, however, between the context of Section 301 deferral and that of
NLRB deferral-distinctions that undermine the soundness of the
Section 301 rationale in the NLRB context. The initial legitimizing
premise of Section 301 deferral is that courts and arbitrators have
concurrent jurisdiction over the private contractual rights of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. The Board, however, adjudicates statu-
tory rights that are distinct and separate from contractual rights.
Thus, the "concurrence" in jurisdiction between the Board under Sec-
tion 10 and the arbitrator under the contract is merely over conduct,
not rights. In fact, the Supreme Court has never expressly qualified its
early holding that the Board is the exclusive tribunal with power to
vindicate the statutory rights.179
In addition to this distinction regarding the nature of the juris-
dictional overlap, each aspect of the Supreme Court's Steelworkers
Trilogy180 rationale either argues against NLRB deferral to arbitra-
tion or it does not apply. First, the Steelworkers Trilogy rationale not
178. The Board has expressly cited the Steelworkers Trilogy opinions as support in its major
decisions. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984); United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840, 844 (1971). Even
without specifically mentioning the Supreme Court opinions, however, the Board has
consistently based its policy on the same grounds as the Steelworkers Trilogy. For deferral
decisions noting the Act's general policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of labor disputes,
see Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574; United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 558; Electronic
Reproduction, 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 760 (1974); United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879, 881
(1973); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 531 (1972); Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843;
Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1098 (1961); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080, 1082 (1955); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943). The Board
frequently refers to the parties' contractual agreements in order to resolve disputes through
grievance arbitration procedures. See, e.g., United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 559;
Electronic Reproduction, 213 N.L.R.B. at 760-61; United Aircraft, 204 N.L.R.B. at 881;
National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. at 531; Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 842-43. Occasionally, the
Board also declares its confidence in the arbitrators' ability to resolve the statutory issues in a
manner consistent with the purposes of the Act. See, e.g., United Aircraft, 204 N.L.R.B. at
879; National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. at 531; Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 839. In addition to relying
on these aspects of the Steelworkers Trilogy rationale to support its deferral policy, the Board
has occasionally cited its case load and limited resources as motivating factors. See, e.g.,
Electronic Reproduction, 213 N.L.R.B. at 761 (the need to avoid dual litigation); United
Aircraft, 204 N.L.R.B. at 880; National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. at 531-32.
179. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
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only emphasizes the parties' contractual promise to resort to griev-
ance arbitration, but it also requires it.18' There is generally no clear
reason to conclude that the parties' agreement to arbitrate disputes
arising under their private contract is also a promise to arbitrate viola-
tions of independent statutory law. 82 Second, the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy rationale stresses the Act's general policy favoring private,
internal adjustment of labor disputes. 83 Yet this policy pertains only
to contractual disputes: The LMRA's concrete expression of general
policy in Section 203(d) 8 4 specifically limits that policy to "disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of [a] ... collective bar-
gaining agreement." ' 5 By defining certain labor practices as unlaw-
ful and creating a special tribunal with exclusive authority to remedy
such practices, Congress clearly expressed its intention that the par-
ties should not have to rely on internal adjustment processes to rem-
edy these particular unfair labor practices. 186 Third, the Steelworkers
Trilogy rationale notes the special expertise of arbitrators. An arbitra-
tor's expertise, however, is limited to interpreting the labor contract
and the "common law" that has developed around the parties' rela-
tionship under the contract." 7 Congress created a special federal
181. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
("[T]he judicial inquiry under Section 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether
the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power
to make the award he made.").
182. Although unions generally take unfair labor practice charges to arbitration in response
to the Board's pre-arbitral deferral policy, the typical labor contract does not provide that the
parties agree to take statutory issues to arbitration. For example, in the Collyer opinion, the
relevant grievance arbitration clause defined grievance as any controversy involving "the
interpretation, application or violation of any provision of this agreement." Collyer, 192
N.L.R.B. at 839. The Board acknowledged that the clause "makes clear that the parties
intended to make the grievance and arbitration machinery the exclusive forum for resolving
contract disputes." Id. (emphasis added). In fact, although labor and management possess
some power to contract around the statutory law, and thereby alter the law that the Board
would apply to a dispute, it is not clear that the parties are free to waive their right to seek
redress before the Board. See Lodge 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp.,
337 F.2d 5 (1964); see also United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 563 (Zimmerman, Member,
dissenting) (arguing that although a union may waive some individual statutory rights, the
union cannot waive an individual employee's right to litigate an unfair practice issue before the
Board).
183. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
184. LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
185. Id. For the language of Section 203(d), see supra note 3.
186. Supreme Court has stated: "The Board as a public agency acting in the public interest,
not any private person or group, not any employee or group of employees, is chosen as the
instrument to assure protection from the described unfair conduct in order to remove
obstructions to interstate commerce." Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 309 U.S. 261, 265 (1940).
187. As Member Zimmerman points out in his dissent in United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557 (1984), the "arbitrator['s] competency is primarily in 'the law of the shop, not
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agency to administer unfair labor practice protections precisely
because it appreciated the inherent complexity involved in investigat-
ing, adjudicating, and remedying alleged violations of these statutory
protections. Congress intended the Board to develop and apply a spe-
cial expertise in this area. 188
The Board's deferral policy essentially equates "encouragement
of collective bargaining" with "required resort to arbitration" and
then reflexively deems any result reached through fair and regular
arbitration as "consistent with the Act" or "not repugnant." This
perspective fails to acknowledge the distinction that Congress recog-
nized between conduct that violates the labor contract and conduct
outlawed as unfair by statute. The design of the Act evidences Con-
gress' intent: Congress carved out unfair labor practices for special
treatment because it recognized that these practices, unlike run-of-
the-mill contract disputes, undermine the parties' ability to invoke the
collective bargaining process-the very process that is normally relied
upon to resolve the labor dispute. In its entirety, the Act encourages
collective bargaining. Within that broad framework, the Act
prescribes a specific role for the Board-to intrude when managers,
union officials, or employees act in a manner that threatens the collec-
tive bargaining relationship established by the Act. If Congress had
intended the Board to limit its unfair labor practice jurisdiction to
situations in which the parties had no binding internal procedures for
the law of the land.' " Id. at 563 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting) (quoting Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981)). Furthermore, "even if the arbitrator is
conversant with the Act, he is limited to determining the dispute in accordance with the
parties' intent under the collective-bargaining agreement." Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)).
188. In its major decisions finding that the NLRA preempts state law, the Supreme Court
strongly emphasized the special expertise and procedure that Congress evidently considered
necessary for the enforcement of Section 8. In Garner v. Chauffers & Helpers Local Union
No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), the Court declared:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any
tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It [confided] primary
interpretation and application of [unfair labor practice protections] to a specific
and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for
investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial
relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that
centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary ....
Id. at 490.
Again, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Court
observed that "the unifying consideration of our [preemption] decisions has been regard to the
fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a central-
ized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized
knowledge and cumulative experience." Id. at 242; see also Amalgamated Util. Workers, 309
U.S. at 264-66 (vindication of unfair labor practice freedoms and protections is confided to the
Board).
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resolving disputes, it almost certainly would have stated such inten-
tions expressly at some point in the legislative history of the Act, if
not in the Act itself.1 89
B. Proposed Deferral Policy for Arbitral Situations
The Board would achieve a more appropriate accommodation
between the Act's general policy of encouraging internal adjustment
of labor disputes and its specific protection of the rights deemed fun-
damental to collective bargaining by limiting its post-arbitral and pre-
arbitral deferral to those situations in which contractual issues are
dispositive of the statutory charges.' 9° With respect to other statutory
issues, arbitrators should not purport to resolve them, and in any
case, the Board should conduct an independent review and appraisal
of evidence related to such statutory charges.' 91
This approach would not necessarily result in wasteful duplica-
tive proceedings. Duplicative proceedings are the product of a cur-
rent Board deferral policy that forces parties to seek arbitration in the
first instance. With the recommended change in NLRB policy, the
parties might generally be expected to proceed directly to the Board.
More reliable enforcement of the statutory protections might even
result in fewer violations. In addition, a deferral policy that recog-
nizes grievance settlements as final' 92 and provides for Board review
of arbitral decisions might lead to more settlements being reached
through grievance procedures, thereby conserving both arbitral and
Board resources. 193
189. Although Congress did not expressly state an intention that the courts should defer
their Section 301 jurisdiction, judicial deferral comports with, rather than opposes, the general
design of the Act.
190. Deferral should further be limited to contractual dispositions that do not involve a
waiver of Section 7 rights. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
191. If an arbitral ruling has already been issued, the Board, by policy, might properly defer
to the arbitrator's findings of fact and to any contract or common law interpretations common
to both the contractual and statutory issues. The relationship between the Board and the
arbitrator would be roughly analogous to the relationship between judge and jury when a case
presents some issues triable to the court and others triable to the jury: The judge is bound by
the jury's findings as to any common factual issues. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196
n. 11 (1974). Note, however, that such deferral would be discretionary. The Supreme Court
has already held that the Board is not bound by an arbitrator's findings as a matter of law.
Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
192. See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
193. It currently takes as long as three years to prosecute unfair labor practice charges
before the Board, a procedural delay that'can affect the parties' relative bargaining strength in
settlement discussions. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1795-97 (1983). This lengthy delay
might force charging parties to pursue their contractual remedies while waiting for a later
Board proceeding to adjudicate the statutory issues. If duplicative proceedings result merely
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C. Proposed Deferral Policy for Private Settlements
The NLRB's current deferral policy makes little distinction
between an arbitration award that results from the Board's mandated
pre-arbitral deferral practice and a settlement voluntarily arrived at
during grievance negotiations that precede arbitration. 19 4 The two sit-
uations are distinguishable, however, in ways that have important
implications for deferral. First, while mandatory arbitration thwarts
Congress' intent that the Board adjudicate unfair labor practice
charges,' 95 grievance settlements exemplify precisely the type of vol-
untary, internal adjustment that Congress was trying to promote.
Grievance settlements confirm, rather than interfere with, the collec-
tive bargaining process; they sustain, rather than chill, the employees'
enthusiasm for engaging in concerted activity. Grievance settlements
thus further the public interest considerations that the Board is
charged to protect. Second, private settlements contain an element of
waiver not present with mandated arbitral resolutions. The Supreme
Court has held that the parties' contractual power to regulate labor
relations includes a limited power to alter the entitlements and protec-
tions of the Act. 96 Because ongoing dispute negotiation is as central
to the collective bargaining process as is periodic negotiation of a con-
tract, 97 and because a greater power generally presupposes a lesser
power, the Board should recognize a limited authority that permits
union officials to compromise statutory protections and entitlements
in order to settle a particular dispute. 98 In other words, the rationale
from such backlogs at the Board, the Board must temporarily increase its resources to remove
the delay, alter the procedural dynamics of the settlement discussions, and thereby reduce its
future case load.
194. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
196. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v, NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983); NLRB v. Magnavox
Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967);
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (right to strike); Labor Bd. v. Rockaway
News Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line).
197. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960)
("[T]he grievance machinery . . . is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-
government."); see also supra note 91 (similar Board vision of the collective bargaining
process).
198. In Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546 (1985), enforced sub nom. Mahon v. NLRB,
808 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987), the Board held that the union could waive its members'
statutory protections as part of grievance negotiations. This overturns earlier Board rulings
that held that "[ilt does not follow [from the Supreme Court's recognition that a union can
waive some of its members' statutory rights] ... that a union may waive an employee's right
under the Act to have his employer's unfair labor practice remedied." American Cyanamid
Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 440, 441 (1978). Additionally, at least two courts of appeals had held that a
private arrangement does not bar the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction over an unfair labor
practice violation no matter how happy the parties are with the arrangement. Lodge 743, Int'l
[Vol. 44:341
NLRB DEFERRAL POLICY
underlying deferral to grievance settlement is not that the parties have
adequately adjudicated the statutory issues (a power reserved to the
Board), but that the parties have resolved their dispute-the goal that
initially motivated Congress to create the Act and its protections.
Given these distinctions between the circumstances that sur-
round arbitration awards and those that surround grievance settle-
ments, the Board's deferral policy should clearly distinguish between
the two. Whereas the Board should independently review and
appraise the statutory issues associated with an arbitrated dispute,
controversies settled during grievance discussions require only a mini-
mal measure of review. The Board need only ascertain that the par-
ties to the settlement are official representatives of the employees
affected by the conduct at issue and that these officials intended the
settlement as an end to the controversy.'99 The Board's approach
to grievance deferral in Alpha Beta" agrees well with this
recommendation.
Much of the critical commentary on NLRB deferral policy has
emphasized the protection of individual statutory rights. A change in
Board policy that no longer recognizes the remedial rights of individ-
ual employees, and thus accords greater deference to non-arbitral set-
tlements, certainly will heighten this concern. Those who advocate
the protection of individual rights, however, refuse to allow that
unfair labor practice protections-indeed, the entire NLRA-are pre-
mised on a notion of collective strength and collective rights.2°'
Unlike other federal statutory protections that are aimed at alleviating
discrimination or enhancing civil rights, the NLRA recognizes no
intrinsic public interest in its protections. The rights of the Act were
enacted solely for the instrumental purpose of "encouraging the prac-
Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1964); International
Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir.
1964). Even assuming that a union possesses the power to alter the controlling law, such
power should not affect the Board's unrestricted Section 10(a) jurisdiction to adjudicate and
remedy an unfair labor practice charge. The Board would simply apply the law as altered by
any valid waivers. Therefore, this proposal suggests that the Board effectuate such power
through its deferral policy.
199. In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that a waiver of statutory protections is
subject to the duty of good faith representation and limited to rights that do not "impair the
employees' choice of their bargaining representative." Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 705-
06; Magnavox, 415 U.S. at 325. Of course, the Board's policy on deferral to grievance
settlement should incorporate these and other express limitations on the parties' power to
waive statutory protections.
200. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
201. As the Court has stated, "[t]he [NLRA] ...extinguishes the individual employee's
power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen
representative to act in the interests of all employees." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
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tice and procedure of collective bargaining, '  a goal that is itself
instrumental to the ultimate goal of industrial peace. Accordingly,
Congress did not intend that violations of the Act would vest individ-
ual victims with a remedial entitlement. 20 3  Individual protections
lodge, instead, in the rights of a collective bargaining agreement and
in a bargaining representative's duty of fair representation.
MICHAEL K. NORTHROP
202. See supra note 2.
203. In one of its first explanatory opinions of the Act, the Supreme Court declared that
"[n]o private right of action is contemplated." Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 267 (1940). The Court went on to contrast the statutory protections
of the NLRA with the antidiscrimination protections afforded by the Interstate Commerce
Act, noting that the procedure provided by the NLRA is:
prescribed in the public interest as distinguished from provisions intended to
afford remedies to private persons.... [I]n their bearing upon private rights they
are wholly dissimilar. The Interstate Commerce Act . . . imposes upon the
carrier many duties and creates in the individual corresponding rights .... The
[National Labor Relations Act] ... contains no such features.
Id. at 268-69.
Shortly thereafter, the Board again stated: "[T]he central purpose of the Act . .. [is
directed] toward the achievement and maintenance of workers' self-organization .... The Act
does not create rights for individuals which must be vindicated according to a rigid scheme of
remedies." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193-94 (1941).
The Board's decision in Texaco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1985), reveals a proper under-
standing of unfair labor practice protections as promoting the public interest in peaceful labor
relations rather than as providing individual remedial entitlements. In Texaco, the Board
deferred to a strike settlement agreement in which the union agreed to withdraw Section
8(a)(3) charges resulting from the employer's unlawful withholding of sickness and accident
benefits during an authorized strike. Id. at 1335-37. In doing so, the Board noted that the
general rationale for not deferring-that the Board's Section 10(a) power to act in the public
interest is not affected by other means of adjustment-fails to analyze how the public interest is
adversely or favorably impacted by a particular strike settlement agreement. Id. at 1336. In
conducting such an analysis in Texaco, the Board explained that if it gave "paramount con-
cern" to the employees' private interests in being compensated for the employer's statutory
violations, it would ironically be interfering with the public interest in peaceful resolution of
labor disputes that the Act was intended to foster. Id.; accord Energy Coop., Inc., 290
N.L.R.B. No. 78, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1256 (1988).
204. See supra note 58. Even were unfair labor practice rights intended to protect the
individual rather than the institutional process, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
NLRA rights and antidiscrimination legislation and expressly held that the Act "contemplates
that individual rights may be waived by the union." Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460
U.S. 693, 706 n. 11 (1983). Furthermore, the Court has stated that the statutory bargaining
representative exercising this power must be allowed "a wide range of reasonableness ... in
serving the unit it represents." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
